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Gathered around a delicatessen table, officials of Obron Atlan-
tic Corp. sat in stunned silence one day in November 1988. A fed-
eral grand jury subpoena had been served that morning on the little
company, a maker of powdered brass, demanding information as
part of a criminal price-fixing investigation. Over sandwiches,
Obron General Manager James E. Owen broke the silence and
wondered aloud to his lieutenants: Who could have sent investiga-
tors probing into their obscure industry?
"We sat there for an hour trying to figure out who started the
investigation," says Warren Tisdale, Obron's controller at the time.
The answer, Obron officials would learn much later, was none other
than Mr. Owen, the German-owned company's top U.S. official.
Using his insider's access and a $39.95 Radio Shack recorder, Mr.
Owen taped unsuspecting executives at his and other companies
brazenly coordinating industry-wide price increases.'
Antitrust violations are notoriously difficult to detect.2 As the
Obron Atlantic case demonstrates, without information from an in-
sider, collusive arrangements often elude antitrust enforcement. Thus,
employees of corporate violators can be fertile sources of incriminat-
ing evidence. As recognized centuries ago, "[w]hen you know others,
then you are able to attack them."'3
* J.D. Candidate, 1996; B.S. 1989, University of California at Berkeley. I would like
to thank my wife, Andrea, for her loving support and Professor James McCall and Mr. Jim
Lynch for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Jeff Bailey, Executive Mole: How an Officer of a Firm-Not ADM-Became an
Antitrust Informer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1995, at Al.
Although Owen was discharged before he was discovered to be the informant, this
scenario demonstrates the value of insider information. See infra note 13.
2. Se4 eg., Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, Address Before the Criminal Antitrust Law and Procedure
Workshop, ABA Section of Antitrust Law (Feb. 23, 1995) (transcript available in Westlaw,
1995 WL 75292, at *7 (D.OJ.)) ("One of the most difficult challenges of criminal antitrust
enforcement is becoming aware of the possibility that an antitrust crime has been
committed.").
3. SuN Tzu, THm ART OF WAR 83 (Thomas Cleary trans., 1988).
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Unfortunately, whistleblowers like James Owen are rare; employ-
ees are unlikely to risk their employment, careers, and community
standing to turn on the corporations that provide their income.4 In-
ducement is needed. In the case of an employee discharged for
whistleblowing or for refusing to participate in an antitrust violation,
the courts may be able to provide the necessary inducement. Such an
employee has suffered injury that is remediable through the courts.
Thus, the courts may create an opportunity to take advantage of these
pivotal wellheads of inside information by allowing wrongfully dis-
charged employees5 to redress their injuries under the antitrust laws.
The antitrust laws, however, are conventionally the province of
consumers and competitors; under what precept may discharged em-
ployees wield antitrust plaintiff status? The core of both the federal
and California antitrust laws is the preservation of free competition. 6
To further this goal, compensate injured parties, and deter potential
violators, 7 both the federal Clayton Act and California's Cartwright
Act enlist private attorneys general. Each Act accomplishes this en-
listment by granting standing to "any person" injured "by reason of'
4. See Hal Lancaster, Workers Who Blow the Whistle on Bosses Often Pay a High
Price, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1995, at B1 (discussing how whistleblowers may find career
options limited because "[n]obody likes someone who tattles"); Carl Quintanilla & Anna
D. Wilde, You Dirty Rat, Says Decatur, IlL, of Mole at Archer-Daniels, WALL ST. J., July 13,
1995, at Al (discussing how a community rejected a "model citizen" because he blew the
whistle on his employer's antitrust violations).
5. Although the phrase "wrongfully discharged employee" is conclusory, I use it in
place of the more cumbersome phrase "employee allegedly discharged for refusal to par-
ticipate in or for 'blowing the whistle' on alleged antitrust violations." For purposes of
standing analysis, I assume that the defendant violated the relevant antitrust law and that
the plaintiff was terminated for refusal to participate in that violation. As in the tort con-
text, "wrongfully discharged" includes those who are actually discharged and those who
are coerced to resign (known as a "constructive discharge"). See, e.g., Turner v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1994) ("Constructive discharge occurs when the em-
ployer's conduct effectively forces an employee to resign.").
6. See Act of Mar. 23, 1907, ch. 530, 1907 Cal. Stat. 984, 984 (stating that a purpose of
the act is to promote free competition in commerce); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (stating that the legislative history of the Clayton Act shows a "con-
gressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors"); Anne K. Bin-
gaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Address
Before the Criminal Antitrust Law and Procedure Workshop, ABA Section of Antitrust
Law (Feb. 23, 1995) (transcript available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 75292, at *2 (D.O.J.))
("Americans chose from the beginning of the Republic to organize their economy around
the principle of open competition .... Price fixing and the other criminal violations of the
Sherman Act are the antithesis of open competition.").
7. See Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust
Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 809 & n.2 (1977) (finding widespread recognition by courts of
the compensatory and deterrent functions of private treble damage actions under federal
antitrust law).
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an antitrust violation.8 Nevertheless, although private litigants repre-
sent an important source of antitrust enforcement,9 a literal interpre-
tation of this statutory language goes too far and would grant standing
to litigants far removed from the antitrust violation.10 Such violations
cause economic "ripple" effects'" with broad indirect impact. Thus, to
avoid duplicative liability and the resulting excessive penalties, courts
have developed standing requirements to limit the expansive statutory
wording and to seek efficient enforcers.
12
As James Owen of Obron Atlantic demonstrates, an employee
may become an important source of enforcement information.
13
However, the question of whether an employee who is discharged for
exposing antitrust violations' 4 can seek redress under the antitrust
statutes poses a complicated standing issue.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the concept of
antitrust standing several times.' 5 Nonetheless, the federal appellate
courts have split on the issue of whether a wrongfully discharged em-
8. The federal provision is found in section 4 of the Clayton Act, which states, "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1994).
The California counterpart, found in the Cartwright Act, states, "[a]ny person who is
injured in his or her business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared
unlawful by this chapter, may sue therefor... and to recover three times the damages
sustained ... and shall be awarded a reasonable attorneys' fee together with the costs of
the suit." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 1987).
9. See e.g., RicsARDi A. PostR, ANTrrRusT LAW 227-32 (1976) (arguing that, de-
spite some excessive litigation, private actios have made an enormous contribution to
antitrust enforcement).
10. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519,529 (1983) ("A literal reading of [section 4 of the Clayton Act] is broad enough to
encompass every harm that can be attributed directly or indirectly to the consequences of
an antitrust violation.").
11. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,476-77 (1982) ("An antitrust violation
may be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation's economy .... ").
12. See Virginia G. Maurer, Antitrust and Rico: Standing on the Slippery Slope, 25
GA. L. REv. 711, 715 (1991) (listing policy considerations involved in antitrust standing
questions).
13. Mr. Owen provided information to the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division
before he was terminated. Bailey, supra note 1. However, Mr. Owen's motivation to pro-
vide evidence may have been the same as a wrongfully discharged employee. He was an-
gry because Obron fired both of his daughters, he expected Obron to fire him, and he felt
that providing information to the authorities would be "the only way to clear myself." IL
Eventually Obron did terminate Mr. Owen. Ld.
14. For the purpose of this Note, an employee discharged for informing authorities of
the defendant's violations is equivalent to an employee refusing to participate.
15. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 529 (1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 480 (1982); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
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ployee has standing under the federal antitrust laws. 16 Because of this
split in authority, federal district courts have come to disparate results
in factually similar cases.' 7 The confusion has even led different
judges in the same district court to opposite conclusions.' 8 This disa-
greement between the courts has also spurred much scholarly
comment. 19
16. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated,
460 U.S. 1007 (1983), reinstated on remand, 740 F.2d 739, 742 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dis-
missed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985) (allowing standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act); In re
Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S.
1016 (1983) (denying standing).
17. For cases allowing standing, see Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div. of Cargill,
Inc., 843 F. Supp. 759, 772 (D. Me. 1994); Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 1423, 1439 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776,
781 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
For cases denying standing, see Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 804
(N.D. Utah 1988); Thomason v. Mitsubishi Elec. Sales Am., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1563, 1570
(N.D. Ga. 1988); Reitz v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 552, 554 (S.D. Fla. 1988);
Winther v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 100, 103 (D. Colo. 1985); Callahan v. Scott Paper
Co., 541 F. Supp 550, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp.
1387, 1390 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
18. Compare Gonsalves v. Kaiser Sand & Gravel Co., No. C92-3561BAC, 1993 WL
452669, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1993) (Caulfield, J.) (granting standing) with Vinci v.
Waste Management, Inc., No. C94-1946FMS, 1994 WL 478163, at *2-*6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25,
1994) (Smith, J.) (denying standing).
19. For commentary urging courts to grant standing under section 4 of the Clayton
Act, see Gary M. Shaw, Retaliatorily Discharged Employees' Standing to Sue Under the
Antitrust Laws, 67 OR. L. Rav. 331, 391 (1988) (arguing that allowing standing is correct
under the Supreme Court's standing analysis articulated in Associated General and consis-
tent with congressional intent); Matthew H. Lynch, Note, Antitrust Standing After Associ-
ated General Contractors: The Issue of Employee Retaliatory Discharge, 63 B.U. L. REv.
983, 1037 (1983) (arguing that wrongful discharge may have an anticompetitive effect in the
employment market, and, if this effect were shown, a wrongfully discharged employee
would have standing); John A. MacKerron III, Note, Discharged Employees: Should They
Ever Have Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 839,
869 (1983) (arguing that courts distinguish between per se and non-per se violations when
granting standing); J. Michael Naughton, Jr., Note, Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.: Antitrust
Standing Under Section 4: A Departure from the Definitional Approach, 3 PACE L. REv.
739, 770 (1983) (concluding that the federal circuit courts should follow the Ninth Circuit
analysis in Ostrofe and grant standing); Note, Employee Standing Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1846, 1866 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court's anti-
trust standing doctrine and the policies behind the antitrust laws support granting
standing).
For commentary urging courts to deny standing to a wrongfully discharged employee,
see Rathleen Chouai, Note, Discharged Employees and Treble Damages: The Outer Limits
of "Antitrust Injury", 44 U. PiTr. L. REv. 1005, 1036 (1983) (arguing that wrongfully dis-
charged employees lack "antitrust injury"); Laurie N. Feldman, Comment, Employees Dis-
charged in Retaliation for Resisting Employers' Antitrust Violations: The Need for a Federal
Remedy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 559, 579 (1984) (concluding that wrongfully discharged em-
ployees lack "antitrust injury" and calling for a federal remedy for such employees); Brad-
ley G. Haas, Comment, The Discharged Employee's Standing to Sue Under Section 4 of the
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The California counterpart to the federal antitrust laws is the
Cartwright Act.20 Although the Act is not coextensive with the fed-
eral laws,21 California courts have generally applied interpretations of
federal law when construing the Cartwright Act.22 In the private
standing context, this application is logical because the relevant pri-
vate standing provisions in the Cartwright and Clayton Acts are
nearly identical.23 However, despite the similar language and the Cal-
ifornia courts' deference to federal interpretation, the "exact parame-
ters" of antitrust standing under the Cartwright Act "have not yet
been established through either court decisions or legislation."'24
Two California appellate courts have addressed the issue whether
a wrongfully discharged employee has standing under the Cartwright
Act.25 Neither court granted standing to the employee. Nevertheless,
this Note argues that California courts should grant standing to
wrongfully discharged employees under the Cartwright Act. Simply
put, the analysis in the two existing decisions is flawed. The courts
failed to recognize (1) the distinct legislative history of the Cartwright
Act, (2) relevant California case law, and (3) compelling policy rea-
sons to grant standing. The Cartwright Act's history and subsequent
amendments indicate the California Legislature's desire to expand
private antitrust standing beyond the confines of federal doctrine.26
Furthermore, Cartwright Act case law recognizes this desire and ex-
ceeds the boundaries of federal analysis. More specifically, granting
standing to wrongfully discharged employees is consistent with previ-
ous Cartwright Act decisions. Additionally, wrongfully discharged
employees offer unique enforcement opportunities without the
Clayton Ac4 54 U. ON. L. REv. 191, 212 (1985) (concluding that a wrongfully discharged
employee has not suffered "antitrust injury," as described infra Part ll.A.2); Stephen J.
Horvath III, Note, Standing of the Terminated Employee Under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 341, 371 (1983) (arguing that a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee lacks "antitrust injury" and that granting standing is not consistent with the reme-
dial and deterrent purposes of the antitrust laws); James A. Montee, Note, Antitrust Suits
by Discharged Employees, 49 Mo. L. Rnv. 135, 146 (1984) (approving of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's conclusion that a wrongfully discharged employee lacks "antitrust injury").
20. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16770 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995).
21. See SECTION OF ANTrRUST LAW, A.B.A., 6-2 to 6-4 (1990) [hereinafter STATE
ANTrn UsT PRACrICE AND STATUTES] (stating that the Cartwright Act is closely analogous
to but not coextensive with section 1 of the Sherman Act and sections 3 and 4 of the
Clayton Act).
22. Se4 e.g., Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833, 835 (Cal.
1976) (stating that federal cases interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable to problems
arising under the Cartwright Act).
23. See supra note 8.
24. Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 313 (Ct. App. 1993).
25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra Part III.A.2.
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problems associated with other private plaintiffs.27 The complexity
and expense of antitrust litigation, coupled with the less complex tort
of wrongful discharge, act to filter out weak plaintiffs and ensure that
the grant of standing does not produce excessive litigation. Therefore,
antitrust standing for wrongfully discharged employees would greatly
enhance the effectiveness of California's antitrust enforcement
efforts.28
Part I gives a brief history of wrongfully discharged employee ac-
tions under the Cartwright Act. Because California courts rely heav-
ily on the interpretation of analogous federal antitrust statutes,
29 Part
II.A describes the development of federal antitrust standing doctrine
and the federal requirement of "antitrust injury." Part II.B discusses
the application of the federal antitrust standing doctrine to the case of
a wrongfully discharged employee. Part III then examines Cartwright
Act standing doctrine and explores the reasons for differences be-
tween the state and federal doctrines. Part IV concludes this Note by
examining the analytical and policy reasons for granting standing to a
wrongfully discharged employee under the Cartwright Act and by cri-
tiquing the California decisions in this light.
I. History of Wrongfully Discharged Employee Suits Under
the Cartwright Act
Two California appellate courts have confronted the issue of
whether a wrongfully discharged employee has standing under the
Cartwright Act. The first consideration occurred in the 1979 case of
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 30 in which Gordon Tameny claimed
that Atlantic Richfield discharged him for refusal to participate in a
violation of the Cartwright Act. Tameny advanced five causes of ac-
tion: three tort actions, one breach of contract action, and an action
27. See infra Part IV.
28. This enhancement is especially true because, unlike other state antitrust laws, the
application of the Cartwright Act is not limited to intrastate activity. Thus, wrongfully
discharged employees may expose antitrust violations of the most complex and interstate
character. See Janet L. McDavid, The California Experience: A Hole in the Illinois Brick
Wall?, 1 ANTITRusr 16, 16 (1987) (noting that application of the Cartwright Act is not
limited to intrastate commerce and citing a case in which a single indirect sale to a Califor-
nia purchaser gave a California court jurisdiction over the case).
29. See supra note 22.
30. 152 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Ct. App. 1979). Tameny alleged that he refused to cooperate
with his employer's allegedly illegal attempt to persuade Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) retail-
ers to reduce their gasoline prices. Id. at 53. This vertical price restraint would be illegal as
a conspiracy in restraint of trade. See G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., 195 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217 (Ct.
App. 1983) ("Two forms of conspiracy may be used to establish a violation of the [Cart-
wright Act]: a horizontal restraint, consisting of a collaboration among competitors; or a
vertical restraint, based upon an agreement between business entities occupying different
levels of the marketing chain.") (citations omitted).
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under the Cartwright Act.31 The trial court sustained a demurrer to
all but the contract cause of action, which the plaintiff had voluntarily
dismissed.32 With little analysis, the California Court of Appeal for
the Second District held that an employee discharged for refusal to
participate in antitrust violations does not have standing to sue under
the Cartwright Act.33 The court also affirmed the trial court judgment
sustaining the demurrer to the tort theories.34
The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that an
employee who is discharged for refusal to participate in illegal con-
duct may bring a tort action for wrongful discharge. 35 Thus, the tort
of wrongful discharge was born in California.36 The plaintiff, how-
ever, did not appeal the appellate court's denial of his Cartwright Act
claim. 37
Sixteen years later, in the 1995 case of Vinci v. Waste Manage-
ment, Inc.,38 the California Court of Appeal for the First District also
confronted this standing issue. The Vinci court failed to seize the op-
portunity to utilize the efficient enforcement presented by wrongfully
discharged employees and denied standing.39 Part IV.E argues in de-
31. Tameny, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 53. The three tort actions were (1) wrongful discharge,
(2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) intentional interference
with contractual relations. Id. The contract action was based on the plaintiff's employ-
ment contract. Id.
32. Id. at 53. Since the plaintiff dismissed the contract claim, the appellate court was
concerned only with the other four causes of action. Id.
33. ld. at 55-56. The court stated that "there is no adequate correlation for purposes
of standing to sue under the Cartwright Act between the attempt to illegally fix the price of
gasoline and the discharge of an employee who refuses to cooperate in that activity." Id. at
55. The court held that a wrongfully discharged employee is not within the "target area" of
the antitrust violation. Id. at 56. The "target area" test was used by the Ninth Circuit but
was later rejected by the United States Supreme Court. See R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp.
v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (noting that although
the Ninth Circuit had previously used the "target area test," that test was explicitly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Associated General).
34. Tameny, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
35. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1332-35 (Cal. 1980).
36. See, e.g., Janet Gilligan Abaray, Note, The Development of Exceptions to At-Will
Employment: A Review of the Case Law from Management's Viewpoint, 51 U. CrN. L.
REv. 616, 619 (1982) (noting that Tameny was the first California case to allow both tort
and contract claims in a wrongful discharge case); Laila Boberg Soares, Note, Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co.: Wrongful Discharge, a New Tort to Protect At-Will Employees, 8 W.
ST. U. L. Rv. 91, 91 (1980) (noting that, in Tameny, the California Supreme Court created
the unprecedented tort of wrongful discharge).
Because the Court held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge, it was unnecessary to determine whether the other tort theories were available.
Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12.
37. Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1332 n.5 (stating that, although amicus filed a brief discussing
the Cartwright claim, the plaintiff confined his objections to the tort causes of action).
38. 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 337, 338 (Ct. App. 1995).
39. Id. at 339-40.
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tail that Vinci was wrongly decided because the court's decision was
driven by federal antitrust standing concepts 40 and failed to recognize
that (1) Cartwright Act standing is broader and deeper than federal
antitrust standing; (2) the history of the Cartwright Act, subsequent
legislative amendments, and California case law support a grant of
standing to such an employee; and (3) the verbal formulation of anti-
trust standing concepts should not become a trap that excludes effi-
cient antitrust enforcers when the very purpose of these standing
concepts is to ensure efficient private enforcement.
II. The Federal Antitrust Standing Analysis
A. Standing Requirements Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act
As indicated earlier, a literal reading of section 4 of the Clayton
Act would encompass potential plaintiffs far removed from and tan-
gential to the antitrust violation.41 Because of the almost unlimited
number of potential plaintiffs, the United States Supreme Court has
attempted to define a manageable antitrust standing requirement that
is consistent with the policy behind the antitrust laws. 42 Antitrust
standing doctrine looks to both the relation between the parties and
the type of injury claimed.
(1) The Relation Between the Parties: Directness of Injury
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois43 was one in a series of Supreme
Court cases, beginning in 1977, addressing the issue of standing under
section 4.44 The State of Illinois and 700 local governmental agencies
brought suit alleging that a group of concrete block manufacturers
had conspired to fix prices in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.45 The concrete blocks passed through two separate levels of dis-
40. Id.; see discussion infra Part IV.E. Part II explains the federal antitrust standing
doctrine cited by the Vinci court.
41. See supra note 10.
42. See Robert P. Taylor, Antitrust Standing: Its Growing-Or More Accurately Its
Shrinking-Dimensions, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 515, 517 (1986) (stating that "[t]he body of law
that we call 'antitrust standing' developed historically because courts have never been will-
ing to apply Section 4 of the Clayton Act literally").
43. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
44. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1539, 1543-44 (1989) ("[Tihe modem era of antitrust standing . . . began in
1977 ....").
45. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits conspir-
acies in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The plaintiffs alleged a horizontal price
restraint, which is illegal per se. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940) (establishing that tampering with price structures is illegal per se
under the Sherman Act).
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tribution before being purchased by the governmental agencies.46
First, the blocks were purchased directly from the manufacturers by
masonry contractors who used the blocks to build structures. These
structures were then incorporated into buildings built by general con-
tractors. 47 The completed buildings were in turn sold to the munici-
palities.48 The plaintiff government agencies were therefore indirect
purchasers.
Despite the Court's recognition of "the legislative purpose in cre-
ating a group of 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust
laws," 49 the Court denied standing for indirect purchasers. The Court
articulated three reasons for this denial.50 First, the Court feared that
allowing indirect purchaser standing would lead to multiple liability
and duplicative recoveries.51 Second, the Court did not want to im-
pede antitrust enforcement with "massive evidence and complicated
theories" required for the complex apportionment of overcharges in
such suits.5 2 Finally, the Court stated that direct purchasers would
better serve the legislative purposes behind private enforcement be-
cause such purchasers would not deplete "the overall recovery in liti-
gation over pass-on issues."5 3
To ensure that California consumers continue to enjoy meaning-
ful remedies under the Cartwright Act, the California Legislature re-
pudiated the reasoning and rule of llinois Brick. In 1978, the
Legislature passed an amendment to clarify that those indirectly in-
jured by an antitrust violation do have standing under the Cartwright
Act.5
4
46. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 746 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,262 (1972)) (internal
quotation omitted).
50. Arguably, another reason was consistency with the Court's prior decision in Han-
over Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). In Hanover Shoe, a
manufacturer claimed that its customer was not able to show injury because the customer
was able to "pass on" to its customer the higher prices caused by the manufacturer's anti-
trust violation. Id. at 487-88. The Court rejected the defense that indirect rather than
direct purchasers were the ones injured. Id. at 494.
The Illinois Brick Court characterized Hanover Shoe's factual pattern as the offensive
use of the pass-on theory. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726. The Court decided that the use of
the pass-on theory "must apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants." Id. at 728.
51. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-31. The Court reasoned that a seller would be liable
to direct purchasers and any intermediate purchasers. Id.
52. Id. at 740-41 (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493).
53. Id. at 746-47.
54. Act of Aug. 25, 1978, ch. 536, sec. 1, § 16750(a), 1978 Cal. Stat. 1693, 1693 (codi-
fied as CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a)); see discussion infia Part III.A.2.b. See gener-
ally Blane A. Smith, Note, The California Legislature Steers the Antitrust Cart Right Off the
Illinois Brick Road, 11 PAc. L.J 121 (1979) (analyzing the legislative response to Illinois
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(2) Antitrust Injury
Commentators and courts who would deny standing to a wrong-
fully discharged employee invariably contend that such an employee
has not sustained "antitrust injury. ' 55 Antitrust injury is an element
of the antitrust standing requirement that has been judicially devel-
oped to filter through the vast number of potential plaintiffs and ac-
cept only efficient private enforcers. The Supreme Court has defined
antitrust injury as "the type [of injury] that the antitrust statute was
intended to forestall. '56 Despite the apparently clear and simple lan-
guage of this definition, courts have had difficulty applying the stan-
dard.57 The precise definition is ambiguous at best. Thus, the only
Brick and suggesting methods of handling the procedural difficulties faced by courts in
such suits).
55. Antitrust injury was first articulated as a requirement for a private treble damage
remedy by the United States Supreme Court. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). The Court stated that a treble damage plaintiff "must prove
more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove
antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to pre-
vent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Idt at 489 (empha-
sis added).
Although it is not entirely clear whether antitrust injury is an element of antitrust
standing or a separate concept, I will treat antitrust injury as an element of antitrust stand-
ing. See PHILIP C. JONas, LrrIGATING PRIvATE AwrnRusr AcrioNs § 19.02 (1988)
("[A]ntitrust injury and standing will be regarded as two related subcategories of the issue
of proper parties to sue."); Blair & Harrison, supra note 44, at 1540 (explaining that stand-
ing requirements limit the array of potential plaintiffs, but antitrust injury limits the type of
compensable harm; however, together they form a generalized standing requirement).
For commentary concluding that lack of antitrust injury precludes a wrongfully dis-
charged employee from bringing a suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act, see supra note
19.
Federal cases that deny standing to wrongfully discharged employees do so because of
a lack of antitrust injury. See, e.g., In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 519
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983) (concluding that a wrongfully discharged
employee does not suffer antitrust injury because he was not the target of the anticompeti-
tive practices); Thomason v. Mitsubishi Elec. Sales Am., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (N.D.
Ga. 1988) (holding that a wrongfully discharged employee's injury fails the "target area"
test for antitrust injury).
56. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 540 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Terry Calvani, The Mushrooming Brunswick Defense: Injury to Competi-
tion, Not to Plaintiff, 50 ANnTRUST L.J. 319, 328-33 (1981) (cataloguing the various read-
ings of the Brunswick decision). Calvani showed the difficulty in the language:
In our attempt to discern the meaning of Brunswick, we might apply the
plain meaning rule and take the Supreme Court at its word: "Plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury ... of the type the antitrust laws were intended to pre-
vent .. " Thus, the question becomes what type of injury was it that these laws
were intended to prevent. I suggest that this line of inquiry has historically been
errant and nonproductive. It assumes there to be a consistent rationale underly-
ing the federal antitrust laws. The bane of antitrust law is that there has been no
accepted and internally consistent underlying public policy.
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way to understand antitrust injury and its relation to antitrust standing
requires a review of the Supreme Court decisions in this area.
(a) Brunswick
The seminal case for antitrust injury and modem antitrust stand-
ing analysis is Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.58 In that
case, Brunswick had sold bowling equipment on credit to certain bow-
ling centers.5 9 When the bowling industry went into decline in the
1960s, Brunswick began to acquire defaulting bowling centers.60 The
plaintiff was a competitor of one of the acquired centers and com-
plained that the acquisition violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.61
Essentially, the plaintiff complained that if Brunswick had not ac-
quired its competitor, that competitor would have failed, and there-
fore Brunswick was "denying [plaintiff] an anticipated increase in
market shares." 62
Brunswick did not challenge the claim that the acquisition was an
illegal merger, but rather it questioned whether the plaintiff should
have antitrust standing.63 The Clayton Act was designed to prevent
mergers that may reduce competition.64 Here, the plaintiff com-
plained that it was injured because competition was not reduced.
Although the plaintiff received lower profits because of the unlawful
acquisition, it was not injured by "that which made the acquisitions
unlawful." 65 To hold otherwise "divorces antitrust recovery from the
purposes of the antitrust laws."' 66 The Court therefore required "anti-
The language, "were intended to prevent," seems to imply that Congress had
something in mind[, but] the historical record fails to adduce such a rationale.
d at 325 (footnotes omitted).
58. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
59. Id. at 479. Brunswick sold lanes, automatic pinsetters, and ancillary equipment.
Id.
60. Id. at 479-80. Although Brunswick had a secured interest in the equipment, there
was little demand for the repossessed bowling center equipment. Id. at 479. To cut its
losses, Brunswick acquired and operated the defaulting centers to generate a positive cash
flow. l at 479-80.
61. Id. at 480-81. Section 7 prohibits mergers whose effects "may be substantially to
lessen competition." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Pueblo asserted the "market entrenchment"
theory of illegal mergers. Under this theory, a "giant" firm enters a market dominated by
"pygmies" and reduces horizontal competition because the giant's resources allow it to
make investments in equipment and sustain long price wars. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 482;
see 11 EARL W. KINTNER, FEIERAL ANTITRusr LAW § 36.30 (1984).
62. Brunswick 429 U.S. at 484.
63. Id. The appellate court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding of an illegal acquisition. Id- at 482-83.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
65. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488.
66. Id. at 487.
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trust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent. ' 67
(b) McCready
The Court again addressed the antitrust standing requirements in
Blue Shield v. McCready.68 Carol McCready subscribed to a group
health plan that reimbursed for treatment by psychotherapists, but not
for treatment by psychologists unless supervised by a physician. 69 Mc-
Cready was treated by an unsupervised clinical psychologist, and Blue
Shield rejected her claims.70 McCready sued for damages, alleging a
conspiracy between the insurance company and psychiatrists to boy-
cott psychologists in violation of the Sherman Act.7
1
In addressing the issue of whether McCready had standing under
the Clayton Act's section 4, the Court looked at two questions: (1)
whether the physical and economic relation between the violation and
the harm was close, and (2) whether the injury was of the type Con-
gress was likely to have been concerned about when enacting section
4.72 Considering the first factor, the Court maintained that Mc-
Cready's injury was sufficiently connected because denying reim-
bursement to subscribers was the "very means" of, and a "necessary
step" in, Blue Shield's illegal boycott.73 Because the alleged injury
was "so integral an aspect of the conspiracy," the Court found "no
question" that the injury was of the type likely to be caused by the
violation.7
4
The Court also found that McCready's injury was of the type
Congress was likely to be concerned with-antitrust injury. The
Court found that McCready's injury was "inextricably intertwined
with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on psychologists. '75
McCready's injury thus "'flow[ed] from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful' . . . and [fell] squarely within the area of congressional
concern. ' 76 Although the injury did not reflect the anticompetitive
effect of the alleged violation, the Court found that antitrust injury is
67. Id. at 489.
68. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
69. Id. at 468.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 468-70. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is found in 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
72. Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 478.
73. Id. at 479.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 484.
76. Id. According to the majority, the dissent was unwilling to find the injuries signifi-
cant under the antitrust laws because McCready was a consumer. However, McCready's
participation in the market for psychotherapeutic services was enough for the majority to
implicate the antitrust laws. Id. at 484 n.21.
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not limited to such effects.77 Satisfied that McCready met the two
prongs of its inquiry, the Court allowed McCready to maintain an ac-
tion under section 4.
(c) Associated General
The Supreme Court further refined antitrust standing analysis in
Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters.78 The plaintiff unions alleged that a multiemployer associ-
ation coerced third parties and association members into utilizing non-
union contractors and subcontractors.79 This coercion allegedly
adversely affected unionized firms and therefore restrained the activi-
ties of the unions in violation of the Sherman Act.8 0
The plaintiffs8 l and defendants82 were parties to collective bar-
gaining agreements governing the terms and conditions of employ-
ment in the California construction industry for more than twenty-five
years.83 In an alleged effort to weaken the collective bargaining rela-
tionship between the parties, the defendants allegedly conspired to (1)
induce nonmembers of the association to refuse to enter into collec-
tive bargaining agreements with the plaintiffs; (2) coerce land owners
to hire nonunion contractors and subcontractors; and (3) coerce asso-
ciation members to use nonunion subcontractors.84 The unions
claimed that this conspiracy violated the Sherman Act by restraining
the trade of certain contractors and thus the unions.
85
In deciding whether the unions, as opposed to the individual con-
tractors, could maintain such an action, the Associated General Court
developed five factors for the antitrust standing requirement.8 6 The
77. Id. at 482. The Court agreed that Brunswick embraced the principle that antitrust
injury should be linked to the pro-competitive policy of the antitrust laws. However, the
Court stated that "Brunswick is not so limiting" and that injury from the anticompetitive
effect of a violation is not the only type of injury remediable under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. Id. at 482-83.
78. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
79. Id. at 520-23.
80. Id. at 523 nA. The Sherman Act forbids conspiracies in restraint of trade. 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
81. The plaintiffs represented numerous affiliated local unions and district councils.
Associated Genera4 459 U.S. at 521. These unions represented more than 50,000 individu-
als employed by the defendants in the carpentry, drywall, piledriving, and related indus-
tries. Id.
82. The defendants were a multiemployer membership corporation and its individual
building and construction contractor members. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 522-23.
85. Id. at 523. The plaintiffs claimed twenty-five million dollars in damages. Id. at
524.
86. Id. at 540-44. The Court first noted that the reach of section 4 of the Clayton Act
should be construed in light of common law antecedents to the language originally enacted
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Court generated these factors based on an analysis of the Sherman
Act's legislative history, an evaluation of the plaintiff's harm and the
alleged wrongdoing, and the relationship between the harm and al-
leged wrongdoing.8 7 The Court likened the inquiry to the struggle of
common-law judges to define proximate cause and noted that, be-
cause of the infinite variety of claims, no black-letter rule could be
satisfactory.88 Instead the Court opted to identify the factors bearing
on antitrust standing.8 9 Considering these factors, the Court held that
the unions did not have standing under section 4.90
First, the Court considered antitrust injury.91 The Court found
that the unions had not suffered antitrust injury;92 unlike the plaintiff
in McCready, the unions were neither participants in the restrained
market nor direct victims of coercion.93 The Court also noted that the
broad labor exemption to the antitrust laws and the separate body of
federal law intended to protect and encourage labor unions indicated
that a union, especially in disputes with employers, is usually not part
of the class that the Sherman Act was designed to protect.94 How-
ever, because the unions were not direct victims, the Court reserved
the question whether a direct victim suffering an injury unrelated to
antitrust policies could have standing under section 4 of the Clayton
as section 7 of the Sherman Act. Id. The Court reasoned that frequent references to com-
mon law principles in the legislative history of section 7 of the Sherman Act implies that
Congress assumed those principles would apply to a treble damage claim. Id. at 533.
87. Id. at 535. These factors were required in common law damages litigation at the
time of the adoption of the Sherman Act. Id.
88. Id. at 535-36. The Court quoted Judge Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Is-
land R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928), listing the factors for proximate cause as conven-
ience, public policy, and a rough sense of justice. Associated General 459 U.S. at 536 n.34.
89. Associated General, 459 U.S. at 537.
90. Id. at 545-46. In so holding, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision grant-
ing the unions standing. See California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen.
Contractors, 648 F.2d 527, 538 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit had reasoned that the
unions were in the "target area" of the antitrust violation-"that area of the economy
which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry."
Id. at 537-38 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court denounced this test and insisted that
"courts should analyze each situation in light of the factors set forth in [this] text." Associ-
ated General 459 U.S. at 536 n.33. Despite the Supreme Court's language, some courts
persist in using the "target area" test. See PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW I 334.1b & n.26 (Supp. 1993) (citing circuit court decisions using the test
after Associated General).
91. Associated General, 459 U.S. at 540 (citing Brunswick for the proposition that the
injury must be "of the type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall").
92. Id. The Court noted that the unions were not competitors or consumers in the
restrained market and that it was not clear whether the unions would benefit from en-
hanced or restrained competition in that market. Id. at 539.
93. Associated General, 459 U.S. at 541 n.44.
94. Id. at 539-40. The Court found that, in this case, the unions' labor-market inter-
ests predominated; thus, the Brunswick test was not satisfied. Id. at 540.
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Act.95 Despite finding no antitrust injury, the Court continued to con-
sider the other standing factors.
96
Second, the Court considered the related question of the direct-
ness or indirectness of the plaintiff's injury.97 The chain of causation
between the unions' injury and the alleged conspiratorial conduct con-
tained "somewhat vaguely defined links."98 Third, other potential
plaintiffs were more directly injured than the unions. The existence of
these potential plaintiffs lessened the enforcement value of the un-
ions-some other victim could "vindicate the public interest in anti-
trust enforcement." 99
Fourth, the indirectness of the injury added to the speculative na-
ture of the damages.1°° This indirectness also implicated the final fac-
tor-the duplicative recovery and complexity concerns raised in
Illinois Brick.01 In conclusion, the Court held that the combination
of these five factors precluded a grant of standing to the unions.
(d) USA Petroleum
Although the Court addressed the concept of antitrust injury in
other cases,'0 2 the most in-depth analysis appeared in the 1990 case of
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.103 USA Petroleum
95. Id. at 541. This concept becomes important in the case of a wrongfully discharged
employee if a court decides that termination from employment is an injury unrelated to the
purposes of the antitrust laws. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739,744 (9th Cir.
1984) (reasoning that this reservation allows a broad reading of antitrust injury in the case
of a wrongfully discharged employee).
96. Although the Court's continued analysis may seem to indicate that antitrust injury
is not a requirement for standing under section 4, the Court later confirmed that antitrust
injury is required. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986) ("A showing
of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establish standing under
§ 4 .. ..").
97. Associated General 459 U.S. at 540-41.
98. Id. at 540. Allegedly, the association's conspiracy diverted business from certain
union contractors. Id. The unions maintained that they suffered "unspecified injuries in
[their] 'business activities."' Id at 541. The Court noted that this harm was only an indi-
rect result of the alleged conduct. Id. at 541 & n.46.
99. Id. at 541-42. The Court noted that the existence of direct victims-the firms or
the coerced-whose self-interested private suits would vindicate the public interest in en-
forcement diminishes the need for the more indirect victims-the unions-to act as private
attorneys general. Id. at 542. The Court also found that the existence of more direct vic-
tims who do not assert any claims themselves casts doubt upon whether any "victims" were
harmed at all. Id. at 542 n.47.
100. Id. at 542-43. Also, independent factors could have contributed to the harm al-
leged, thereby increasing the uncertainty of damages. Id. at 542.
101. Id. at 543-45. Specifically, the Court referred to the risk of duplicative recoveries
and the danger of complex apportionment of damages. Id. at 543-44.
102. See eg., Cargill Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986) (requiring antitrust
injury for injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act).
103. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
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(USA), an independent gasoline retailer, competed with Atlantic
Richfield's (ARCO's) retail outlets.1' 4 USA alleged that ARCO vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act by instituting a vertical maximum-
price-fixing agreement-ARCO agreed with its dealers on the maxi-
mum price at which the dealers could sell gasoline-that eliminated
competition between ARCO dealers and drove independent retail
gasoline marketers out of business.10 5 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment, holding that a competitor cannot show antitrust injury
without showing that the prices are predatory.10 6 The Ninth Circuit
reversed.'0
7
The Supreme Court held that USA did not suffer antitrust in-
jury. 08 In effect, USA complained that the vertical maximum-price
restraints created ARCO gasoline prices lower than USA could
match.10 9 USA thus objected to being underpriced by a competitor." 0
Price cutting, however, is central to competition."' Although ARCO
may have violated the antitrust laws, USA did not suffer antitrust in-
jury because it was not "adversely affected by an anticompetitive as-
pect of the defendant's conduct.""12 Additionally, for a number of
104. Id. at 331. USA Petroleum purchased gasoline from major petroleum companies
for resale under its own brand name. Id.
105. Id. at 331-32. Vertical maximum price restraints have been deemed illegal per se
under the Sherman Act. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968).
106. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. at 333. The district court found that even if USA could
establish a conspiracy to restrain prices, USA could not show antitrust injury unless those
prices were predatory. I& Predatory pricing, a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,
has been defined as setting prices below an appropriate level of cost (e.g., average variable
cost) coupled with a dangerous probability of recouping losses from such pricing (e.g., after
driving out competition, a predatory pricer could raise its prices to monopoly levels). See
Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,2587-88 (1993).
107. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. at 333. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that USA's losses
resulted from a disruption in the market caused by ARCO's antitrust violation, and, there-
fore, USA had suffered antitrust injury. Id. at 333-34.
108. Id. at 335.
109. The Court noted that the reasons why vertical maximum price restraints are un-
lawful-because setting prices too low could prevent a small dealer from offering services
desired by customers, thereby channeling distribution through a few large dealers-would
actually benefit an interbrand competitor like USA. Id. at 336-37.
110. Id. at 338 (stating that a firm cannot complain about harm from nonpredatory
price competition).
111. Id. at 338 ("[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence
of competition."' (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 594 (1986))).
112. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. at 339. USA argued that it should not be required to
show predatory pricing because ARCO violated section 1, not section 2, of the Sherman
Act. Id at 338. The Court rejected this argument, holding that although the price restraint
was illegal, it did not cause a competitor antitrust injury unless there was predatory pricing.
Id. at 339.
The Court also rejected USA's contention that no antitrust injury need be shown
when there is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 341. The purpose of the anti-
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reasons, the Court saw little "need to encourage private enforcement
by competitors of the rule against vertical, maximum price"
restraints. 113
B. Application of Federal Standing Requirements to the Case of a
Wrongfully Discharged Employee
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits are the only federal appellate
courts that have addressed the issue whether a wrongfully discharged
employee has standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.114 The
two courts came to opposite conclusions. Both courts rendered their
decisions shortly before Associated General, and both cases were peti-
tioned for certiorari. However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
only to the Ninth Circuit decision and remanded that case to consider
whether Associated General changed the outcome." 5 On remand, the
Ninth Circuit adhered to its original opinion. 1 6 It is unclear how the
more recent case of USA Petroleum would affect these decisions.117
trust injury requirement is to ensure that the plaintiff's harm corresponds to the rationale
for finding a violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 442.
113. Id. at 345. Consumers and dealers are injured by vertical maximum-price re-
straints and could bring suit themselves. Id. Because consumers and dealers are more
directly victimized by vertical maximum-price constraints, there is less of a need to allow
competitors to act as private attorneys general. Id. Additionally, a competitor's injury is
not "inextricably intertwined" with the injury to dealers. Ld.
Furthermore, a competitor would be motivated to sue only wheh a vertical maximum-
price restraint promoted interbrand competition, that is, when the restraint had procompe-
titive effects. Id. A competitor suit, thus, would not protect the rights of dealers and con-
sumers. Id. at 345-46.
114. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
Ostrofe 1] (allowing standing), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), reinstated on remand, 740
F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985); In re Industrial Gas Anti-
trust Litig. (Bichan v. Chemetron Corp.), 681 F.2d 514,515 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1016 (1983). The Third Circuit addressed the closely analogous case of an independ-
ent broker being terminated for refusal to participate in antitrust violations and denied
standing. Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92, 92 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821 (1986). However, an independent broker does not offer the same
enforcement possibilities as a wrongfully discharged employee because such a broker is not
likely to possess the critical inside information that a wrongfully discharged employee
would have.
115. H.S. Crocker Co. v. Ostrofe, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983) (citing Associated Gen. Con-
tractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983)).
116. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Ostrofe Il],
cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
117. Whether a wrongfully discharged employee suffers injury from an "anticompeti-





Frank Ostrofe, a marketing director of H.S. Crocker Company,
alleged that his employer forced him to resign from his position and
that he was boycotted from further employment in the lithograph la-
bel industry because he refused to participate in his employer's viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.118 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit faced the
question of whether Ostrofe had standing under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act. The court held that Ostrofe had standing as a victim (1) of a
boycott in the personal services market, (2) of a boycott to effectuate
a conspiracy, and (3) of a unilateral discharge by a conspirator in fur-
therance of the conspiracy." 9 The Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment and remanded in light of Associated General 20 After
reexamining Ostrofe's standing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that its
original decision remained valid.'
2 '
In the final opinion, the court relied on the McCready rationale
to decide that discharging an employee in furtherance of a conspiracy
gives that employee standing under section 4.122 The court cited Mc-
Cready for the proposition that, regardless of the fact that the injuries
do not result from the anticompetitive effect of antitrust violations,
persons whose injuries are a "necessary step" and the "means em-
ployed" to effectuate an antitrust violation have standing under sec-
tion 4.123 Reasoning that Ostrofe's participation was essential to the
conspiracy, the court found that his discharge was a necessary means
to achieve the illegal ends and an inextricable part of the anticompeti-
tive scheme. 12 4 Despite not being a competitor or consumer in the
labels market, Ostrofe sustained antitrust injury and had standing
under section 4.125
118. Ostrofe , 670 F.2d at 1380. Ostrofe alleged that Crocker conspired with other
lithograph manufacturers of paper lithograph labels to rig bids, fix prices, and allocate
markets. Id.
119. Ostrofe II, 740 F.2d at 740 (summarizing the holding of Ostrofe 1, 670 F.2d at 1379-
80).
120. H.S. Crocker Co. v. Ostrofe, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
121. Ostrofe II, 740 F.2d at 740-41.
122. Id. at 745-46. This Note does not discuss the rationale behind granting a dis-
charged employee standing to challenge an alleged boycott.
123. Id. at 745.
124. Id. at 745-46. Ostrofe sold labels below the prices that were allegedly agreed upon
by the competitors. These sales threatened the conspiracy because other conspirators had
less incentive to adhere to the agreement.
125. Id. at 746. The court saw Ostrofe's discharge as analogous to the Supreme Court's
hypothetical in McCready. Id. at 745-46. The Supreme Court had hypothesized that if
psychiatrists had boycotted a bank, forcing it to cease lending to psychologists, the bank
would have standing under section 4 even though the anticompetitive effects were in the
psychologist market. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 n.21 (1982). Similarly,
Ostrofe's discharge furthered the anticompetitive effects in the labels market. Like the
bank, Ostrofe should have standing.
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The Ninth Circuit also analyzed Ostrofe's standing under the as-
sumption that their reading of McCready was too broad; again, the
court found antitrust injury.126 The court noted that in Associated
General, the Supreme Court had reserved the question of whether a
direct victim of an antitrust violation who suffers an injury unrelated
to antitrust policies can have standing under section 4.127 Thus, the
Ostrofe court allowed standing based on a number of policy factors:
(1) the public interest in effective antitrust enforcement; (2) the desir-
ability of encouraging exposure of antitrust violations; (3) the fact that
the injury is intentional and caused by the violation; and (4) the avoid-
ance of Illinois Brick problems, as the injury is not remote. 128 The
Supreme Court declined further review of the case.129
(2) Seventh Circuit-Bichan
Robert Bichan alleged that he was terminated from his position
as president of Chemtron's Industrial Gas Division and blacklisted by
the industrial gas industry for his refusal to participate in a horizontal
price-fixing conspiracy. 30 Although aware of the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Ostrofe, the Seventh Circuit, in In re Industrial Gas Litiga-
tion (Bichan v. Chemtron Corp.), denied standing under section 4 of
the Clayton Act.' 3
1
The Seventh Circuit held that a wrongfully discharged employee
has not suffered antitrust injury. Recognizing that courts had devel-
oped several tests for antitrust injury, 132 the court applied the target
area test to Bichan's situation.133 Because his injury was not in "the
area of the economy endangered by the anticompetitive scheme"-
the industrial gas market-Bichan did not suffer antitrust injury.1M
126. Ostrofe HI, 740 F.2d at 746-47.
127. Id. at 746; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
128. Ostrofe 1, 740 F.2d at 746-47.
129. H.S. Crocker Co. v. Ostrofe, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
130. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig. (Bichan v. Chemetron Corp.), 681 F.2d 514,
515 (1982), cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1982). Like Ostrofe, Bichan alleged that his em-
ployer was part of a conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act to fix prices,
impose conditions of sale on customers, and allocate markets. Id.
131. Id. at 518-20. The Seventh Circuit decision came after Ostrofe I but before the
Ninth Circuit's reexamination in light of Associated GeneraL
132. The court listed three tests: the target area test, the direct injury test, and the
zone-of-interest test. Id. at 516. For an explanation of these tests, see 9 JULIAN 0. VON
KALiNOWSKI, ANTnRusr LAW AND TRADE REGULATION § 101.02(2)(a)-(c) (1993).
133. Bichan, 681 F.2d at 517. Note that the target area test was implicitly rejected by
the Supreme Court in Associated GeneraL See supra note 90.
134. Bichan, 681 F.2d at 517. The court found that Brunswick limited antitrust injury
to those injuries caused by the anticompetitive effect of the antitrust violation. Id. at 519.
The court claimed that the Ostrofe II court ignored "Brunswick's clear teachings." Id.
Note, however, that Bichan was decided only four days after McCready and did not cite
that case.
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Even assuming arguendo that Bichan had suffered antitrust in-
jury, the court did not believe that he was a proper section 4 plain-
tiff.135 The court interpreted section 4's phrase "by reason of' to
require a direct causal link between the antitrust violation and the
injury.136 Fearing that another interpretation would result in exces-
sive private litigation, the court reasoned that Bichan's injury was in-
directly caused by the alleged price-fixing conspiracy and denied him
standing.137
III. California Antitrust Standing Analysis
A. Standing Requirements Under Business and Professions Code Section
16750
In interpreting the Cartwright Act standing provisions, found in
California Business and Professions Code section 16750, California
courts have historically followed federal court interpretations of the
analogous language in section 4 of the Clayton Act.138 However, the
Cartwright Act's history and amendments favor a broader interpreta-
tion than the federal courts have given the analogous section 4
language.
(1) Current Status of Standing and Antitrust Injury Under the Cartwright
Act
Although the contours of standing under the Cartwright Act are
unclear,139 California courts have formed a rough framework, with
some ideas plucked from federal antitrust standing decisions and
others generated from whole cloth. Throughout the cases, the courts
have recognized the importance of private enforcement.
40
In a 1924 decision, that could be called a precursor to USA Petro-
leum, the California Supreme Court refused to give standing to a
plaintiff who benefited rather than suffered from an antitrust viola-
tion.141 The courts also recognized early on that a plaintiff's injury
135. Id. at 519.
136. Id. The court maintained that this requirement prevents a flood of litigation that
would result in enforcement "overkill." Id.
137. Id. at 520. The court cited Illinois Brick for the proposition that the "by reason
of' language limits antitrust standing to "efficient enforcers." Id. This Note maintains that
a wrongfully discharged employee is an efficient enforcer. See infra Part IV.D.
138. See Smith, supra note 54, at 121.
139. See Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 313 (Ct. App. 1993).
140. See, e.g., Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 327, 333 (Ct. App. 1975) (cit-
ing Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 444 P.2d 481, 492 (Cal. 1968), for the
proposition that private enforcement is authorized and encouraged).
141. Overland Publishing Co. v. H.S. Crocker Co., 222 P. 812, 813 (Cal. 1924). A
printer claimed that the defendants conspired to raise prices. The court noted that the
plaintiff could bid freely for printing work and thus benefited from its competitor's high
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must be related to the restriction of trade or commerce caused by a
conspiracy and not merely result from some other unlawful act com-
mitted by a trust.142
Later cases have adopted much of the reasoning of federal courts.
Thus, California courts have adopted the Ninth Circuit "target area"
test: the plaintiff must be within "the area which it could reasonably
be foreseen would be affected."1 43 A plaintiff must show that its inju-
ries are proximately caused by the antitrust violation. 144 Additionally,
injuries cannot be "secondary," "consequential," or too "remote"; yet,
the courts recognize that the "Act is comprehensive in its terms and
coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden
practices. 1
45
Furthermore, California courts have explicitly adopted the
Brunswick antitrust injury requirement.146 Thus, the courts have
adopted a refinement of the "target area" test: the "plaintiff must
show an injury within the area of the economy that is endangered by a
breakdown of competitive conditions."' 47
Nonetheless, California courts have recognized that although
"California law similarly requires an 'antitrust injury,' the scope of
that term is broader [under the Cartwright Act].' 48 Courts should
rigorously examine this broader scope when considering the case of
the wrongfully discharged employee.
(a) Federal Law-A Caveat
Despite the California judiciary's reliance on federal interpreta-
tion, it is important to remember that California courts are free to
prices. The plaintiff therefore could not show damages, and only the attorney general or
district attorney could bring the action. Id.
142. Krigbaum v. Sbarbaro, 138 P. 364,366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913) (holding that wrongful
acts of the defendant do not give rise to a cause of action under the Cartwright Act merely
because that defendant also happens to be an illegal trust); Munter v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
153 P. 737, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1915) (citing and agreeing with Krigbaum).
143. Saxer, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 338 (quoting Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Gold-
wyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir. 1964), cerL denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964)).
144. Id. at 336 (citing Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1075 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 923 (1971)).
145. Id. at 338 (quoting Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967);
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 919 (1951); Mandeville Island Farms Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
146. Kolling v. Dow Jones & Co., 187 Cal. Rptr. 797, 807 (Ct. App. 1982) ("An 'anti-
trust injury' must be proved; that is, the type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent, and which flows from the invidious conduct which renders defendants' acts
unlawful.").
147. Id. (quoting Solinger v. A&M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d ,1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1978),
and adopting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning).
148. Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 313 (Ct. App. 1993).
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interpret the Cartwright Act in a different manner than federal courts
interpret federal antitrust laws and have done so in the past. For ex-
ample, the California courts have diverged from the federal judiciary
in summary judgment standards for showing the existence of a con-
spiracy' 49 and on the question of whether an intra-enterprise agree-
ment can violate antitrust laws.' 50
Additionally, the opinions adopting federal interpretations did so
under the conception that "the Cartwright Act is patterned upon the
federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act."' 5' However, in 1988, the California
Supreme Court recognized that this notion is false.' 52 The Cartwright
Act was actually patterned after the antitrust statutes of two other
states. This finding would suggest that pre-1988 Cartwright Act opin-
ions based on federal interpretation may not carry full precedential
weight. Finally, the California Supreme Court has cautioned that fed-
eral interpretations of the analogous Clayton Act section 4 language
are not necessarily persuasive. As a 1985 decision stated, the Cart-
wright Act is "broader in range and deeper in reach than the Sherman
Act."153
(b) California Adoption of Ninth Circuit Tests-Another Caveat
Cartwright Act decisions adopting federal interpretations have al-
most invariably relied on Ninth Circuit decisions.154 However, the
Ninth Circuit has abandoned some of the theories, such as the "target
area" test, upon which the California courts still rely.155 This situation
again cautions against blind adherence to previous California court
decisions. This process of absorption of federal antitrust case law into
California decisions tends to leave old, and possibly abandoned, fed-
eral concepts ingrained in Cartwright Act jurisprudence. Thus, if a
Cartwright Act concept is rooted in federal case law, a court should
scrutinize that concept to determine whether it is still valid.
149. See Biljac Assocs. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 267 Cal. Rptr. 819, 827-28 (Ct.
App. 1990) (refusing to adopt the summary judgment standards set forth by the United
States Supreme Court for finding a conspiracy).
150. Cf. MacManus v. A.E. Realty Partners, 241 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 & n.4 (Ct. App.
1987) (leaving open whether California will adopt the United States Supreme Court rule
barring challenges to intra-enterprise conspiracies).
151. Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 327, 333 (Ct. App. 1975).
152. State ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc., 762 P.2d 385, 395 (Cal. 1988).
153. Cianci v. Superior Court, 710 P.2d 375, 384 (Cal. 1985).
154. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
155. Compare R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 146
(9th Cir. 1989) (abandoning "target area" test) with Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court,
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 312 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the plaintiff must be within the
"target area" to have standing under the Cartwright Act).
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(2) Why California Antitrust Standing Should Be Different than Federal
Antitrust Standing
(a) Historical Context of the Cartwright Act's Adoption
The California Supreme Court has attributed various and some-
times conflicting roots to the Cartwright Act. In different cases, it has
asserted that the Cartwright Act was modeled after: (1) Senator Rea-
gan's alternative bill to the Sherman Act; (2) the Sherman Act itself;
and (3) the common law.156 Ultimately, the court alleviated the con-
fusion and declared the antecedents of the Cartwright Act to be the
populist 1889 Texas and the 1899 Michigan antitrust acts.'5 7
The private damages section of the Cartwright Act seems to find
its lineage in the Michigan act. Unlike the 1889 Texas act, section 11
of the C.artwright Act'58 allowed for private causes of action. 159 How-
ever, the private damages provision of section 11 of the Cartwright
Act virtually mirrors the 1899 Michigan act.160 Additionally, although
156. For the three respective conclusions, see Van de Kamp, 762 P.2d at 387 (citing
Cianc 710 P.2d at 384; Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833,835-36 (Cal.
1976); and Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv. Bureau, Inc., 484 P.2d 953, 959 (Cal.
1971)).
157. Van de Kamp, 762 P.2d at 392.
158. This section later became California Business and Professions Code section 16750.
See Act of Sept. 13, 1941, ch. 526, 1941 Cal. Stat. 1834, 1836.
159. Act of Mar. 23, 1907, ch. 530, § 11, 1907 Cal. Stat. 984, 987. Although the 1889
Texas act did not provide for private causes of action, Texas courts did allow suits for
damages caused by a conspiracy in restraint of trade. See THE MARKETNG LAWS SutvEy,
STATE ANrrRusT LAws 724 (1940) (citing Texas Pub. Utils. Corp. v. Edwards, 99 S.W.2d
420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); North Tex. Gin Co. v. Thomas, 277 S.W. 438 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925)).
160. Section 11 of the Cartwright Act read:
In addition to the criminal and civil penalties herein provided, any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation or
association or partnership, by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be un-
lawful by this act, may sue therefor in any court having jurisdiction thereof in the
county where the defendant resides or is found, or any agent resides or is found,
or where service may be obtained, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and to recover twofold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit.
Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceedings under this act
may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties shall be
brought before the court, the court may cause them to be made parties defendant
and summoned, whether they reside in the county where such action is pending,
or not.
Act of Mar. 23, 1907, ch. 530, § 11, 1907 Cal. Stat. 984, 987.
The Michigan act read:
In addition to the criminal and civil penalties herein provided, any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation or
association or partnership, by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be un-
lawful by this act may sue therefor in any court having jurisdiction thereof in the
county where the defendant resides or is found, or any agent resides or is found,
or where service may be obtained, without respect to the amount in controversy,
January 1996] ANTITRUST STANDING
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
several contemporary state antitrust laws allowed private causes of ac-
tion, only the California and Michigan laws provided for twofold dam-
ages. 161 In contrast, the precursor to section 4 of the Clayton Act
provided for treble damages.1 62
These antecedents show that the Cartwright Act's standing provi-
sion, from its inception, was distinct from that of the Sherman Act.
As section 11 of the Cartwright Act was not modeled after the Sher-
man Act, cases relying on federal standing analysis are, a fortiori, less
compelling. Nonetheless, the extensive legislative history of the Sher-
man Act may help to show the prevailing interpretation of the lan-
guage used in the Cartwright Act at the time of its enactment. 63
In contrast to present-day debates over the meaning of section 4
of the Clayton Act, one early commentator stated, "This section is so
plain and precise in all its parts that it requires only to be attentively
read in order to be understood."'164 The legislative debate surround-
ing the adoption of the Sherman Act seems to concur with this broad
interpretation; thus, most commentators find support in these debates
for wrongfully discharged employee standing.165 The populist outcry
and to recover two-fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit.
Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under this act
may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties shall be
brought before the court, the court may cause them to be made parties defendant
and summoned, whether they reside in the county where such action is pending,
or not.
Act of June 23, 1899, no. 255, § 11, 1899 Mich. Pub. Acts 409, 411-12.
The only differences between the two sections are the addition of a comma and the
lack of a hyphen in "twofold" in the California act.
161. By 1915, 35 states had enacted antitrust legislation. James May, Antitrust Practice
and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State
Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 495, 499 (1987). Twenty states expressly
allowed for private recovery of damages: nine states allowed for recovery of actual dam-
ages, nine permitted treble damages, and two (California and Michigan) allowed twofold
damages. Id. at 500.
162. Section 7 of the original Sherman Act provided for threefold damages for any
person injured in business or property by reason of a violation of that Act. This section
was superseded by section 4 of the Clayton Act (section 7 was repealed by Act of July 7,
1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283), which is applicable to the antitrust laws-the Sherman
Act, Clayton Act, and Robinson-Patman Act. Senator Sherman first proposed a twofold
damages provision, see ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW 8-9 (Green-
wood Press 1980) (1910), but the final version provided for threefold damages.
163. For example, the California Supreme Court noted that the California Legislature
probably adopted the language of the Cartwright Act with the judicial gloss of interpreta-
tions of the Texas and Michigan acts' language. State ex rel Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc.,
762 P.2d 385, 393-94 (Cal. 1988).
164. WALKER, supra note 162, at 61 (commenting on the interpretation of section 7 of
the Sherman Act, which is the precursor to section 4 of the Clayton Act).
165. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 19, at 992 ("Congress intended to 'open the door of
justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust
laws."'); Employee Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act supra note 19, at 1857 n.52
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that provided the historical backdrop to the adoption of the Sherman
Act also supports a broad interpretation of the standing provision.
166
Nonetheless, modem courts have found this history less than disposi-
tive.167 However, the California Legislature was most likely aware of
this early plain-meaning interpretation when it adopted the Cart-
wright Act.
The reasoning in Associated General also lends credence to the
argument that the California Legislature adopted the Cartwright Act
with a broad standing interpretation in mind. The Associated General
Court determined that Congress adopted the language of section 7 of
the Sherman Act for section 4 of the Clayton Act with a "judicial gloss
that avoided a simple literal interpretation.' 68 Between the enact-
ment of section 7 of the Sherman Act in 1890 and the adoption of the
Clayton Act in 1914, courts had interpreted the language of section 7.
According to the Associated General Court, Congress adopted the ju-
dicial interpretation-not the plain meaning-when it incorporated
the language of section 7 into the Clayton Act.
In support of this contention, the Court cited two cases limiting
standing when a plaintiff's injury is too remote or merely derivative of
a corporate injury.169 These cases, the first to address the language of
section 7, were decided in 1910 and 1909 respectively, and both cases
("legislative history supports a broad construction of § 4's antecedent"). But see Feldman,
supra note 19, at 568 (noting that Congress did not enact an amendment that would have
extended protection to any person driven out of business for refusing to become a party to
an antitrust conspiracy). Such an amendment was adopted by committee in the 50th Con-
gress, but was not included in the bill as re-introduced in the 51st Congress. See 1 LEGISLA-
TrvE HisToRY oF THE FEDERAL AcrmusT LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 67, 112 (E.
Kitner ed. 1978).
166. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 530 & n.20 (1983) ("The legislative history of the section shows that Congress was
primarily interested in creating an effective remedy for consumers who were forced to pay
excessive prices by the giant trusts .... That history supports a broad construction of this
remedial provision.").
167. See id. at 530 (recognizing that the legislative history of the Sherman Act supports
a broad construction of the standing provision but nonetheless limiting the section's
scope). But see Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948) ("The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are
made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.").
168. Associated General 459 U.S. at 534.
169. Id. at 534 & n.29. The Court cited Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709
(3d Cir. 1910), which held that neither a creditor nor a stockholder of a corporation had
standing under section 7 of the Sherman Act because their injuries were too indirect, re-
mote, and consequential. The Leob court reasoned that Congress did not intend to over-
ride established corporate law concepts. ld. The Court also cited Ames v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 822-23 (D. Mass. 1909), which held that a stockholder did not have
standing under section 7 for injuries not distinguishable from those of the corporation. The
Ames court also reasoned that the Sherman Act did not overrule the principle that share-
holders' interests are represented by the corporation. Id
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held that Congress did not intend to override established corporate
law with the broad language of the Sherman Act. Because no pub-
lished cases interpreted the language of section 7 prior to the Cart-
wright Act's adoption in 1907, the California Legislature did not adopt
this standing language with the narrowing judicial gloss.
The historical context of the adoption of the Cartwright Act also
compels a broad interpretation of the standing provision. The eco-
nomic changes and the advent of trusts in the late 1800s meant that
"[f]armers, traders, laborers, individual business proprietors and small
business enterprises were frequently rendered helpless and often dis-
appeared in the fierce wars of the leviathons [sic] of the new order.' 70
"The trust became a curse. It was an octopus devouring the vitals of
the nation.' 17' This situation caused a "great groundswell of discon-
tent, bitter resentment and articulate indignation" amongst the pub-
lic.172 The "sweeping flames of public protest" resulted in the
adoption of state antitrust laws. 73 In this context, the California Leg-
islature presumably intended a broad standing provision to channel
populist outrage against the goliath trusts and provide redress for the
powerless common man.
The historical context of the Cartwright Act's adoption, the con-
gressional debate on similar language in the Sherman Act, the popu-
list statutory antecedents, and the prevailing broad interpretation of
the statutory language direct the conclusion that the California Legis-
lature intended that the Act include a broad grant of antitrust
standing.
(b) Amendments to the Cartwright Act
Several amendments to the Cartwright Act verify the legislative
intent to endow broad Cartwright Act standing on private litigants.
These amendments also show a legislative intent to enhance the vital-
ity and reach of private enforcement. This intent to expand private
enforcement is obvious from the plain meaning, legislative history,
and historical context of the adoption of these amendments.
In 1959, the California Legislature amended section 16750 by re-
placing twofold damages with threefold damages and by providing for
attorneys' fees and costs. The amendment "was proposed by the [Cal-
ifornia] Attorney General as part of a program to strengthen enforce-
170. Rush H. Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Anti-Trust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. REv.
215, 237 (1953).
171. Id. at 241.
172. Id. at 240.
173. See id. at 240-43.
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ment of the State Antitrust laws."'174 Because the federal antitrust
statutes provided for threefold damages, plaintiffs were seeking re-
dress under the Sherman Act whenever possible.175 The increase to
threefold damages and the award of attorneys' fees and costs were to
encourage "greater use [of the Cartwright Act] and make it, therefore,
a more effective deterrent to unlawful restraints upon trade."'176 As
the author of the amendment stated,
Experience has shown that the most effective deterrent to business-
men from a violation of the antitrust laws is the real threat to their
pocketbooks arising from the potential liability for three times the
damage they have inflicted .... Moreover, antitrust litigation is
notoriously expensive. A successful plaintiff should be allowed to
recover a reasonable attorney's fee as well as the costs of suit.1 77
This amendment was passed overwhelmingly by both the State Senate
and Assembly.178 Significantly, it was enacted at a time when a broad
interpretation of antitrust standing was not questioned.
7 9
Already having increased the incentive to employ the Cartwright
Act, in 1961 the California Legislature sought to ensure the effective-
ness of the Cartwright Act. The 1961 amendment clarified that under
the existing law' 80 the state, political subdivisions thereof, and state
public agencies were "persons" for purposes of section 16750 and thus
may have standing to bring a Cartwright Act action.' 8 ' The amend-
ment also made clear that the state Attorney General could bring suit
on behalf of any one of the aforementioned entities.'82
Although not directly bearing on the scope of private enforce-
ment, the 1961 amendment "commits the State of California to the
maintenance of competitive markets and the protection of consumers
174. Letter from Wallace Howland, Assistant Attorney General, to Governor Edmund
G. Brown (June 19, 1959) (on file at the California State Archives, Governor's Chapter Bill
File, ch. 2078 (1959) (MF 3:2(27))).
175. Id.
176. ld.
177. Letter from Assemblyman Bruce F. Allen, author of the proposed amendment,
A.B. 2593, to Governor Edmund G. Brown (June 24, 1959) (on file at the California State
Archives, Governor's Chapter Bill File, ch. 2078 (1959) (MF 3:2(27))).
178. The Senate passed the amendment by a vote of 26 to 3, and the Assembly ap-
proved it by 62 to 1. Bill Memorandum from Julian Beck, Governor's Legislative Secre-
tary, to Governor Edmund G. Brown (July 13, 1959) (on file at the California State
Archives, Governor's Chapter Bill File, ch. 2078 (1959) (MF 3:2(27))).
179. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 44, at 1543-44 (stating that the narrowing of
private antitrust standing began in 1977).
180. See Act of Sept. 15, 1961, ch. 1023, 1961 Cal. Stat. 2705, 2706 (amending CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 and declaring that the amendment only restated the original
intent of the Cartwright Act).
181. Id. sec. 1(b), 1961 Cal. Stat. at 2706.
182. Id. sec. 1(c), 1961 Cal. Stat. at 2706.
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from private monopoly.' 83 Like the 1959 amendment, the 1961
amendment was introduced "at the request of the Attorney General
to strengthen the anti-trust laws."'1 84 In fact, the Governor held the
need for antitrust enforcement to be so important that he designated
the amendment an "emergency bill" that the legislature should con-
sider immediately.185 As Part IV discusses, wrongfully discharged em-
ployees are uniquely situated to bolster the State's commitment to
antitrust enforcement. A grant of standing would further these legis-
lative goals.
In 1978, the California Legislature took the Cartwright Act stand-
ing analysis off the federal track. In reaction to the United States
Supreme Court's Illinois Brick decision declaring that indirect pur-
chasers do not have standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the
Legislature amended section 16750 to repudiate the Illinois Brick
rule.186 The 1978 amendment assured standing for indirect purchasers
and anyone else who indirectly dealt with the defendant.187
This amendment was a major departure from California's history
of following federal antitrust precedent. 88 The amendment is a clear
indication that California courts should not consider Illinois Brick fac-
tors to be dispositive on the issue of private standing. The legislature
noted these concerns-multiple liability and duplicative recoveries,
massive evidence and complex apportionment, and the existence of
183. J.F. Barron, California Antitrust-Legislative Schizophrenia, 35 S. CAL. L. REv.
393, 405 (1962).
184. Bill Memorandum from Alexander H. Pope, Governor's Legislative Secretary, to
Governor Edmund G. Brown (June 28, 1961) (on file at the California State Archives,
Governor's Chapter Bill File, ch. 1023 (1961) (MF 3:2(31))).
185. Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown to the Honorable Members of the As-
sembly and Senate (Apr. 10, 1961) (on file at the California State Archives, Governor's
Chapter Bill File, ch. 1023 (1961) (MF 3:2(31))). Because the State and its agencies are
required to purchase equipment and supplies by sealed competitive bidding, the State is
particularly affected by price-fixing, collusive bidding, market allocation, customer divi-
sion, and other antitrust violations. Working Papers of Assemblyman Edwin L. Z'Berg (on
file at the California State Archives, Assemblyman Edwin L. Z'Berg, A.B. 893 (1961) (MF
6:3(15))). The Legislature thus considered the standing clarification urgent. Letter from
Assemblyman Edwin L. Z'Berg to Governor Edmund G. Brown (Apr. 7, 1961) (on file at
the California State Archives, Assemblyman Edwin L. Z'Berg, A.B. 893 (1961) (MF
6:3(15))).
186. See Act of Aug. 25, 1978, ch. 536, see. 1, § 16750(a), 1978 Cal. Stat. 1693, 1693
(codified as CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a)).
187. Id.
188. See Smith, supra note 54, at 121 ("California traditionally has harmonized inter-
pretations of its own antitrust statutes with federal interpretations of the Sherman-Clayton
antitrust acts. The California Legislature sounded a discordant note in 1978 ...." (foot-
notes omitted)).
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other potential attorneys general' 89-but passed the amendment
unanimously.190 The amendment preserved the progressive consumer
protections for which California is known.191
(3) Can California Antitrust Standing Be Different?
The difference caused by the 1978 Amendment between the
standing provisions of section 16750 and section 4 of the Clayton Act
came into focus in California v. ARC America Corp. .192 California
and a number of other states brought an action against several cement
producers, alleging a "nationwide conspiracy to fix prices in violation"
of both federal and the respective state statutes.193 At issue in the
case was the Ninth Circuit's holding that section 4 of the Clayton Act,
as interpreted by Illinois Brick, preempted the state antitrust statutes
allowing recovery for indirect purchasers. 194 However, the United
States Supreme Court found that "Congress intended the federal anti-
trust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies."' 95
Furthermore, "nothing in Illinois Brick suggests that it would be con-
trary to congressional purposes for States to allow indirect purchasers
to recover under their own antitrust laws."'1 96 The state laws allowing
such actions are "consistent with the broad purposes of the federal
antitrust laws: deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the
compensation of victims of that conduct."' 97 Accordingly, the Court
held that the state antitrust laws were not preempted. 98
Significantly, the Court did not address whether the indirect pur-
chaser provisions violated the Commerce Clause by burdening inter-
state commerce. Arguably, the issue was covered by the Court's
decisions construing other state commercial statutes. 199
189. Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, Bill Digest, A.B. 3222 (May 11, 1978) (on
file at the California State Archives, Senate Committee on Judiciary, A.B. 3222 (1978) (ME
1:51(14))).
190. Enrolled Bill Memorandum to Governor, A.B. 3222 (Aug. 22, 1978) (on file at the
California State Archives, Governor's Chapter Bill File, ch. 536 (1978) (ME 3:3(50))).
191. Letter from John W. Witt, San Diego City Attorney, to Senator Alfred H. Song,
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (June 6, 1978) (on file at the California State
Archives, Senate Committee on Judiciary, A.B. 3222 (1978) (MF 1:51(14))).
192. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
193. Id. at 97-98.
194. Id. at 99.
195. Id. at 102.
196. Id at 103.
197. Id. at 102.
198. Id. at 105-06.
199. See Michael Edwards, Contribution, The California Cartwright Act, 4 GLENDALE
L. REv. 233, 247-49 (1982) (arguing that the indirect purchaser provision of the Cartwright
Act is not unconstitutional under Supreme Court decisions).
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The Supreme Court allowed the state laws to operate even
though the scope of their standing provisions directly contradicted
federal interpretation of analogous antitrust laws. Under ARC
America, California courts appear to be free to grant standing to
wrongfully discharged employees under the Cartwright Act despite
any contrary Clayton Act section 4 holdings by the United States
Supreme Court.
IV. A Wrongfully Discharged Employee Should Have
Standing Under the Cartwright Act
It is still unclear whether a wrongfully discharged employee can
have standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act. However, given the
ambiguity of antitrust standing under the Cartwright Act, California
courts should seize the opportunity to benefit from the unique en-
forcement position of such an employee. Such private attorneys gen-
eral offer access to information not available to other litigants. At the
same time, these plaintiffs do not present the difficulties often inher-
ent in private litigants. For example, a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee is unlikely to have an incentive, as would a competitor, to use
the antitrust laws to pervert competition.200 Additionally, granting
standing to wrongfully discharged employees would be consonant
with the legislative intent of promoting private enforcement and with
Cartwright Act case law.
A. Case Support
Two California appellate court cases may be applied to support
the grant of standing to a wrongfully discharged employee. In Alfred
M. Lewis, Inc. v. Warehousemen Local Union No. 542,201 the plaintiff
claimed that a labor strike against it was part of a conspiracy between
the plaintiff's competitors and the union.20 2 The union and the plain-
tiff's competitors had agreed that the union would demand higher
wages from the plaintiff. These higher wages were intended to make
competition with the plaintiff's competitors unprofitable.20 3 When the
plaintiff refused to raise its wages, the union declared a strike and
picketed the plaintiff's premises.204 The plaintiff sought to enjoin the
strike, but the trial court found for the defendant, holding that the
200. For a full discussion of the difficulties inherent in private antitrust enforcement,
see discussion infra Part IV.D.
201. 330 P.2d 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
202. Id. at 55-56. The San Diego Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Dealers Association was
an association of produce dealers that acted as a collective bargaining unit with the union.
Id. The plaintiff, another produce dealer, was not a member of the association. Md2
203. Id. at 56.
204. Id.
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National Labor Relations Act guaranteed the defendant's right to
strike.20
5
The appellate court, noting first that injunctive relief could be
sought under section 16750,206 ruled that conduct "used to effect [a
conspiracy] may result in actionable damages... even though such
conduct if not used to effect the agreement would be lawful. '207
From Alfred M. Lewis comes the concept that damaging conduct
used to effectuate a conspiracy gives standing under the Cartwright
Act. As recognized in Ostrofe, terminating an uncooperative em-
ployee is conduct that can effectuate an antitrust violation.2 08 Addi-
tionally, unlike a normal labor strike, terminating a refusing or
whistleblowing employee is unlawful in California. The unlawfulness
of this conduct makes the application of Alfred M. Lewis even more
logical. If the court is willing to make actionable lawful conduct used
to effectuate a conspiracy, the court should be more willing to make
unlawful conduct actionable.
In Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. . Sosnick & Son,20 9 a wine
distributor (Sosnick) refused to enter into an illegal market allocation
agreement with a producer-distributor (Guild).210 Allegedly because
of this refusal, Guild terminated Sosnick as a distributor. 211 The court
ruled that if Guild terminated Sosnick because of a refusal to enter
into an illegal agreement, "the termination itself is in violation of the
Cartwright Act."212
Like Sosnick in Guild Wineries, a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee is terminated for refusal to participate in an antitrust violation.
However, unlike the litigants in both of the above cases, a wrongfully
discharged employee is not a competitor. Nevertheless, the "statute
does not confine its protection to ... competitors." 21 3 Thus, despite
this distinction, Alfred M. Lewis and Guild Wineries support the grant
of antitrust standing to such employees.
205. Id. The trial court recognized that the defendant's agreement violated the Cart-
wright Act but ruled that the federal law precluded the application of the Act. Id.
206. Id. at 59.
207. Id. at 60.
208. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
209. 162 Cal. Rptr. 87 (Ct. App. 1980).
210. Id. at 89. Agreements that allocate markets between competitors are per se viola-
tions of the Sherman Act. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Be-
cause Guild had entered the distribution market, it was both a supplier and competitor of
Sosnick.
211. Guild Wineries, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
212. Id. at 93 (ruling that Sosnick's proposed jury instruction, see id. at 90 n.3, should
have been given).
213. Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 327,338 (Ct. App. 1975) (quoting Man-
deville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
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B. Adoption of Federal Standing Analysis in California Courts Would Be
Modified by the 1978 Amendment to the Cartwright Act
If the California courts were to continue to follow federal anti-
trust standing precedent, the courts would have to modify the analysis
in light of the Legislature's rejection of Illinois Brick and its desire to
expand Cartwright Act standing. Specifically, if the courts were to
adopt the standing analysis enunciated in Associated General, Califor-
nia courts would be precluded from incorporating the second, third,
fourth, and fifth factors, namely, the indirectness of injury, the exist-
ence of more directly injured potential plaintiffs, the speculative na-
ture of the damages, and the potential for duplicative recovery and
complex litigation.214 Clearly, the courts could not consider the Illi-
nois Brick concerns of duplicative recoveries and complex litigation,
but the 1978 amendment also precludes the other three considerations
because they are related to the indirectness of the injury.
215
The California courts would thus be left with the first part of the
Associated General test: antitrust injury.216 Because the federal
courts have not agreed whether a wrongfully discharged employee has
standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act, even strict adherence to
federal interpretation would leave open the question of such an em-
ployee's standing under the Cartwright Act.
C. Isn't the Tort of Wrongful Discharge Enough?
Since Tameny established that, in California, a wrongfully dis-
charged employee can state a tort cause of action, such an employee
can be compensated for injuries.217 Compensation, however, is only
one reason for private standing under the Cartwright Act.21 8 The de-
terrent value of granting standing to wrongfully discharged employees
is great.219 Not only would employers fear exposure by such employ-
ees, but even if the employer did not terminate the employee, the em-
ployee who refused to participate in an antitrust violation would act as
an obstruction to the violation.
Additionally, the lure of treble damages and attorneys' fees is
needed to induce more employees to expose their employers' viola-
tions. Employees who refuse to participate in their employers' viola-
214. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
215. The speculative nature of damages and the existence of more direct victims arise
because of the indirectness of the injury. However, the 1978 amendment guarantees stand-
ing to those who deal indirectly with the defendant. CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 16750
(West 1995).
216. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
218. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 7, at 809.
219. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 19, at 391 (noting that "[e]mployees are in the best
position to detect and disclose covert anticompetitive schemes").
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tions or who inform enforcement authorities of those violations may
face adverse career consequences even after they leave their employ-
ers.z2 0 Furthermore, wrongful discharge actions may not suffice to
compensate the employee for the loss of reputation and career
prospects.221
However, the existence of a tort cause of action enhances the de-
sirability of granting antitrust standing to wrongfully discharged em-
ployees. Antitrust actions are notoriously expensive and complex.
Thus, wrongfully discharged employees with weak cases will lean to-
ward the simpler tort cause of action 222 The existence of the tort thus
acts to screen potential litigants and ensures that discharged employ-
ees will not bring frivolous antitrust claims. The lure of treble dam-
ages and attorneys' fees may be outweighed by the complexity,
expense, and attendant risk of an antitrust action. With the simpler
alternative of a tortious wrongful discharge claim, allowing wrongfully
discharged employees to bring Cartwright Act claims would not pro-
voke excessive antitrust litigation.
Finally, granting antitrust standing to wrongfully discharged em-
ployees would accomplish one thing that the tort remedy could never
accomplish: a collateral estoppel effect for follow-on litigation by
other antitrust victims. Because a wrongful discharge tort plaintiff
need not prove the underlying violation,223 such a tort action may not
explore the underlying antitrust violation. This failure makes wrong-
ful discharge tort actions useless to other victims. Only a fully liti-
gated antitrust case, which can only be accomplished by granting
standing to wrongfully discharged employees, can have the collateral
estoppel and thus deterrent effects necessary to enhance antitrust
compliance.
220. See eg., Hal Lancaster, Workers Who Blow the Whistle on Bosses Often Pay a
High Price, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1995, at B1 (discussing how whistleblowing affected three
individuals' careers).
221. See Ud
222. In a wrongful termination action, a discharged employee need not prove that the
employer actually violated the underlying law; the employee need only reasonably believe
that the alleged corporate action was illegal or unsafe. See cases cited infra note 223.
223. Cf. Collier v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 453, 453 (Ct. App. 1991) (allowing
wrongful discharge tort action for employee allegedly discharged for reporting suspicions
that co-employees were engaged in illegal activity); Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr.
159, 165 (Ct. App. 1982) (allowing wrongful discharge tort action for employee allegedly




The use of private attorneys general to enforce antitrust laws has
been attacked by some commentators;224 nevertheless, "private en-
forcement [of the Cartwright Act is] authorized and encouraged." z 5
The amendments to the Cartwright Act show that the California Leg-
islature values privates attorneys general as enforcers. In contrast,
Congress has not amended section 4 of the Clayton Act in any way to
encourage private litigants.226
In addition to serving the Legislature's desire to encourage pri-
vate enforcement, a grant of standing to wrongfully discharged em-
ployees avoids the pitfalls found in suits brought by other private
litigants. Criticism of private antitrust enforcement centers around
several asserted deficiencies. First, private antitrust litigation can be
used improperly to subvert competition.227 Second, private enforce-
ment focuses on more visible violations; thus, for those violations, the
need to encourage private enforcement is limited.2 28 Third, treble
damages and joint and several liability rules may be used to extort
payment even when litigation success is unlikely.22 9 Fourth, the pros-
pect of treble recovery may be an incentive not to avoid antitrust
damages.230 Finally, unlike public enforcement, private enforcement
demands that resources be used to determine and allocate damages.231
A wrongfully discharged employee would be an appropriate
Cartwright Act private litigant because such an employee would not
significantly implicate these concerns. First, the employee would be
224. See, e.g., KENNETH G. ELZINGA & WILLIAM BRErr, THE ANwrrRusT PENALTIES
81-96 (1976) (arguing that private actions are a source of perverse incentives, generate
misinformation in the form of nuisance suits, and use up scarce resources).
225. Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 327, 333 (Ct. App. 1975).
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). However, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act authorizes state
attorneys general to bring civil actions in the name of their state or as parens patriae on
behalf of state residents. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-435, sec. 301, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.) 1383, 1394-96 (codified as 15 U.S.C.
§ 15c). This amendment does not, however, encourage private attorneys general.
227. See generally William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert
Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985) (arguing that private antitrust litigation may be
used to seek protection from competition).
228. See Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of
Private Antitrust Enforcement Follow-On and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74
GEo. L.J. 1163, 1164 (1986) ("[B]ecause vertical practices are not likely to be covert, one
rationale for trebling damages, to encourage efforts to detect offenses, may not apply.").
229. See ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 224, at 90-95 (arguing that treble damages en-
courage antitrust "nuisance suits"); Kauper & Snyder, supra note 228, at 1164 (arguing that
the joint and several liability rule allows the plaintiff to decide which defendant to go
after).
230. See ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 224, at 84 (arguing that treble damages pro-
vides a "perverse incentive" not to avoid incurring damages).
231. See id. at 95.
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unlikely to misuse the antitrust laws because, unlike a competitor, the
employee would not have a monetary incentive to pervert competi-
tion.232 Second, a wrongfully discharged employee is also in a unique
position to detect not only visible violations, but also covert antitrust
violations that may not be uncovered without inside information.
233
Third, although an action could be used to extort payment, as could
any wrongful discharge action, joint and several liability concerns
would not arise because only the employer would be liable.234 Fourth,
public policy encourages an employee to refuse to participate in anti-
trust violations. Thus, unlike other litigants, policy dictates that an
employee not change his behavior to avoid damages; otherwise, dam-
aging antitrust violations will continue. Finally, the determination and
allocation of damages in a wrongfully discharged employee case is rel-
atively simple. While a competitor's alleged damages may in fact be
caused by other economic factors, a discharged employee's damages
are relatively easily linked to the loss of employment.
Finally, perhaps the strongest policy reason for allowing wrong-
fully discharged employees standing under the Cartwright Act is their
ability to enhance enforcement efforts by detecting antitrust viola-
tions. Wrongfully discharged employees are in a unique position to
detect covert antitrust violations.
235
Private antitrust enforcement tends to "focus on conduct that is
visible and has a clear 'victim.' 'z 6 Vertical offenses tend to be more
overt than horizontal conspiracies-for example, a manufacturer may
announce a vertical price restriction to its distributors, but a group of
manufacturers will keep their price-fixing agreement secret. Thus,
vertical offenses attract more litigation.237 This situation has led to
criticism of the private damages remedy because vertical restraints are
now widely considered to be benign.238
232. A discharged employee who later competes with or works for a competitor of the
former employer would have such an incentive; however, this possibility does not diminish
the public utility of an action by the discharged employee. This incentive would be no
greater than other presently accepted private antitrust litigants.
233. See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
234. Although several parties may participate in the antitrust violation, only the em-
ployer causes injury to the plaintiff by termination.
235. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ArrusTr POLICY 257 (1976) (stating
that private antitrust enforcement "may be the most effective way of policing the multitude
of... violations that will tend to escape the glance of... authorities").
236. Kauper & Snyder, supra note 228, at 1222.
237. See ad at 1164, 1180 tbl. 3 (showing, in a ten-year study of 1983 cases, that 47.3%
of private independently initiated antitrust cases alleged vertical violations, as opposed to
28.5% alleging horizontal violations).
238. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 231 ("[IThe trebling of damages in cases where
the alleged violation is not the kind that can normally be concealed is wholly unjusti-
fied[;] ... it merely attracts excessive [litigation]."); Kauper & Snyder, supra note 228, at
1164 ("Economic analysis is generally more critical of cases alleging vertical offenses.").
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However, wrongfully discharged employees can provide for de-
tection of clandestine horizontal violations. Because, by definition,
such an employee has refused to participate in an antitrust violation,
the employee can provide direct evidence of the key issue in horizon-
tal violation cases, namely, the existence of an agreement.239 Wrong-
fully discharged employees can thus strengthen enforcement against
the most troubling and anticompetitive antitrust violations240 as well
as more apparent conspiracies.
A recent action by the Department of Justice demonstrates this
phenomenon. As a result of the cooperation of an employee, the De-
partment is conducting an antitrust inquiry into the practices of
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM) and other grain proces-
sors.241 Mark Whitacre, the president of ADM's BioProducts Divi-
sion, provided antitrust enforcement officials with secret recordings of
hundreds of price-fixing conversations between ADM and its compet-
itors.242 Although Whitacre was not a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee, the type of information he provided demonstrates the
enforcement value of antitrust actions by such employees. As dis-
cussed earlier, the lure of treble damages, attorneys' fees, and costs
will induce wrongfully discharged employees with strong cases to
come forward with the incriminating evidence that only an insider
could possess. The courts would do well to recognize that these insid-
ers are invaluable. "Therefore no one in the armed forces is treated as
familiarly as are spies, no one is given rewards as rich as those given to
spies, and no matter is more secret than espionage. ' 243
E. Vinci v. Waste Management, Inca: A Missed Opportunity
Recently, the California Court of Appeal for the First District
was confronted with an opportunity to seize the antitrust enforcement
value of the wrongfully discharged employee. The court failed to do
so and forestalled California's utilization of these litigants indefinitely.
Leonard Vinci became an employee of Waste Management when
Waste Management acquired his recycling business.244 According to
239. Cf. Biljac Assocs. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 267 Cal. Rptr. 819, 834 (Ct. App.
1990) (dismissing case for insufficient proof of an agreement).
240. Even the Chicago School of antitrust theory, which is usually skeptical of antitrust
intervention, recognizes that horizontal conspiracies are inherently anticompetitive. See
William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization,
Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221, 1223 (1989).
241. Seeds of Doubt: An Executive Becomes Informant for the FBI, Stunning Giant
ADM, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1995, at Al.
242. Id.
243. SUN Tzu, supra note 3, at 170.
244. Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 337, 338 (1995). Vinci operated
Vinci Enterprises, a competitor of Waste Management in the recycling market. Id.
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Vinci, Waste Management was attempting to monopolize the San
Francisco Bay Area garbage collection and recycling market by ac-
quiring its competitors and by engaging in predatory pricing.245 Vinci
alleged that he was ordered to participate in Waste Management's an-
ticompetive conduct, refused, and was discharged for his refusal.246
To determine whether Vinci had standing under the Cartwright
Act, the court cited Associated General for a five-part antitrust stand-
ing test: "(1) the existence of an antitrust violation with resulting
harm to the plaintiff; (2) an injury of a type which the antitrust laws
were designed to redress; (3) a direct causal connection between the
asserted injury and the alleged restraint of trade; (4) the absence of
more direct victims so that the denial of standing would leave a signifi-
cant antitrust violation unremedied; and (5) the lack of a potential for
double recovery." 247 In denying standing to Vinci, the court focused
on the second and fourth factors. Citing only federal authority, the
court held that Vinci's termination was not the type of loss that the
Cartwright Act was intended to prevent, that is, Vinci lacked antitrust
injury.248 The court noted that Vinci was not a competitor or partici-
pant in the recycling market and, citing Bichan, that Vinci's injury was
not the result of Waste Management's acquisition of market power.249
Moreover, the court noted that the targets of the alleged anticom-
petitive conduct were the "normal parties to remedy the antitrust vio-
lation."250  Thus, the court held that a wrongfully discharged
employee is not a proper party to bring a Cartwright Act action.25'
Ostrofe, despite being a Ninth Circuit case, did not deter the Vinci
court. First, the court confined Ostrofe to the wrongfully discharged
employee who is "an essential participant" in the antitrust violation,
"which could not have succeeded without his active participation. '252
Second, the court noted that in Ostrofe there was no one else with a
strong incentive to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforce-
245. Id. at 339. The Cartwright Act does not have a provision analogous to section 7 of
the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that "pose, at most, an incipient threat to compe-
tition." State ex reL Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc., 762 P.2d 385,396 (Cal. 1988). However,
the Cartwright Act may prohibit attempted monopolization by anticompetitive conduct.
See State Antitrust Practice and Statutes, supra note 21, at 6-16 (citing cases that apply the
Cartwright Act to monopolization conduct but also cases that state that the Cartwright Act
does not apply to single firm behavior).
246. Vc4 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339.
247. Id. at 339 (footnote omitted) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537-44 (1983)).
248. Id. at 339-40.






ment.253 Finally, the court claimed that subsequent Ninth Circuit de-
cisions limited Ostrofe to its unique facts.254 The court noted that
Vinci had not alleged that he was an essential participant or the sole
potential antitrust vindicator.2 55 Thus, he did not fall under the Os-
trofe rubric.
The Vinci decision fails for three reasons: (1) the court failed to
recognize that Cartwright Act standing has diverged from federal anti-
trust standing analysis; (2) the court ignored the Cartwright Act's his-
torical antecedents, subsequent legislative amendments, and
California case law that address Cartwright Act standing; and (3) the
court allowed the verbal formulation of antitrust injury to defeat the
purpose of antitrust standing analysis-that of selecting efficient
enforcers.
The Vinci court adopted a five-part standing analysis wholly from
Associated General. However, the court did not recognize that the
1978 amendment placed antitrust standing under the Cartwright Act
on a different path. As discussed in Part IV.B, this amendment pre-
cludes California courts from considering four of the five factors cited
by the court. Because of this amendment, the court should not have
considered whether there was a more direct victim of the violation.
Thus, the court erred when it ruled that Vinci's standing was pre-
cluded because the targets of Waste Management's anticompetive
scheme were more natural private attorneys general and because
Vinci had not alleged that he was the sole vindicator.
Nevertheless, the court's consideration of antitrust injury was ap-
propriate. The court, however, did not recognize that "the more re-
strictive definition of 'antitrust injury' under federal law does not
apply to [the Cartwright Act]. '256 The court merely asserted that a
wrongfully discharged employee has not suffered the type of injury
that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. In support of this
proclamation, the court cited only federal cases. The court's decision
lacked any reference to contrary federal decisions, California case law,
or legislative history. The court mentioned neither Alfred M. Lewis,
finding antitrust injury from conduct used to effectuate a conspiracy,
nor Guild Wineries, finding antitrust injury for refusal to participate in
an antitrust violation. In divining what injuries the California Legisla-
ture intended the Cartwright Act to redress, the court failed to ana-
lyze the Act's historical antecedents or the 1959, 1961, and 1978
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 1986); Exhibitors'
Serv., Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema, 788 F.2d 574, 580 (9th Cir. 1986)).
255. Id.
256. Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 313 (Ct. App. 1993).
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amendments. Instead, the court relied on federal cases interpreting
the Sherman Act, whose antecedents are distinct.257
In further support of its contention, the court cited Bichan for the
proposition that Vinci did not suffer antitrust injury because his injury
was not the result of Waste Management's acquisition of market
power s58 However, this factor is merely another formulation of the
target area test.259 It seems anomalous that the same court should
adopt the Associated General standing analysis and yet adopt the tar-
get area test that Associated General abandoned.
Additionally, the court noted that Vinci was not a competitor or a
consumer in the affected market. However, the Cartwright Act "does
not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to com-
petitors, or to sellers. '260
The court made much of the Ostrofe "essential participant" lan-
guage. The court found support for this focus in two subsequent
Ninth Circuit decisions, neither of which dealt with a wrongfully dis-
charged employee who exposes an antitrust violation.261 It is not
clear, however, how a court would determine whether a particular
wrongfully discharged employee's participation is essential. Because a
corporation can only act through its agents, seemingly any employee
ordered to participate is essential. Nonetheless, any such test would
not be applicable to the Cartwright Act. Guild Wineries gave standing
257. V'mci, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339-40.
258. Id. at 340.
259. The entire quote from Bichan is: "[W]e conclude that Bichan has sustained no
'antitrust injury' because, while he may have suffered some injury-in-fact, he was not the
target of the alleged anticompetitive practices. His injury, therefore, did not result from
defendants' acquisition or exploitation of market power." In re Industrial Gas Antitrust
Litig. (Bichan v. Chemtron Corp.), 681 F.2d 514, 519 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016
(1982).
260. Cellular Plus, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312 (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
261. Vinc4 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340. Neither of the two cases involve a wrongfully dis-
charged employee. In Exhibitors' Service, Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema, 788 F.2d 574,
580 (9th Cir. 1986), a licensing agent alleged that its termination was the result of a conspir-
acy between film distributors and exhibitors. The court found that the agent may have
been discharged as part of the unlawful agreement, but its continued employment would
not have stood in the way of the conspiracy. Id. at 580. Thus, Ostrofe did not apply.
Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839, 840 (9th Cir. 1986), involved a claim by union
electricians that their employer and national union conspired to restrain trade in the labor
market to "monopolize the design and construction of nuclear power plants." The plaintiff
complained that the restraint of trade depressed wages. Noting that competition tends to
depress wages, the Ninth Circuit found that none of the Associated General factors applied.
Id, at 844-46. Ostrofe did not apply because the electricians were not victims of a boycott
nor were they an integral part of the anticompetive scheme to monopolize the nuclear
power plant construction market. Id. at 846.
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under that Act for those who refuse to participate in a violation.262
Additionally, removing an obstructionist employee is part of the effec-
tuation of such a violation. Thus, per Alfred M. Lewis, a wrongfully
discharged employee would have standing under the Cartwright Act
even if that employee's participation were not essential.
Finally, the court failed to look beyond the formulation of the
antitrust injury test to the purposes of that test. Antitrust injury doc-
trine acts to sift through the legion of injured parties to discover effi-
cient private enforcers. As discussed in Part IV.D, wrongfully
discharged employees present unique enforcement advantages with-
out the drawbacks inherent in many potential private attorneys gen-
eral. In short, the Vinci court allowed the antitrust injury tail to wag
the Cartwright Act dog. It allowed the semantic formulation of anti-
trust injury to defeat the purpose of that test and disqualified an at-
tractive private enforcement litigant.
Conclusion
Wrongfully discharged employees are uniquely situated to vindi-
cate the public interest in antitrust enforcement while avoiding the
drawbacks of other private attorneys general. However, because the
literal language of the Cartwright Act provides an overbroad standing
provision, the courts are forced to limit the range of potential private
litigants and seek efficient enforcement. Recognizing this need, the
courts have developed the concept of antitrust standing as a means to
uncover efficient enforcers. Do wrongfully discharged employees fall
within the rubric of antitrust standing, or does this judicially devel-
oped screen for antitrust litigants sift them out despite their enforce-
ment advantages? Because of the ambiguity in the federal antitrust
injury test, federal courts faced with this question have reached con-
trary conclusions.
Notwithstanding this confusion among the federal courts, Califor-
nia courts must not slavishly follow federal antitrust standing prece-
dent. California courts must recognize that because of historical
antecedents, historical context, legislative amendments, and California
case law, Cartwright Act standing analysis is distinct from federal anti-
trust standing analysis. Underlying this distinction is antitrust injury.
Although the concept of Cartwright Act antitrust injury remains rid-
dled with ambiguity, Cartwright Act antitrust injury is distinct from its
federal counterpart.
The Vinci court overlooked these distinctions. The court blindly
applied federal antitrust standing analysis without regard to the dis-
262. Employees who refuse to participate include both the employee who refuses to
act and the one who refuses to remain silent, namely, the whistleblower.
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tinctive history of the Cartwright Act. Additionally, the court failed
to acknowledge the ambiguity in the federal antitrust injury definition.
In doing so, the court missed an opportunity to take advantage of the
distinctive enforcement qualities of wrongfully discharged employees.
Vinci should be overruled. California courts should take advantage of
the unique position of wrongfully discharged employees and grant
them standing under the Cartwright Act.

